



Why did "the domino effect" not reach 
Algeria?
Limitations and prospects of socio-political transformation
Abstract:
1'he year 2011 will be one of the most memorable in the modern Arab history because of 
the wave of revolutions which led to the overthrow of long ruling autocrats in I'.gvpt, Tuni­
sia, Yemen and Libya. Algeria is so far the only country in North Africa that has not experi­
enced sustained mass protests calling for a political change. T his paper intends to explain 
why the Arab Spring has not spread to /\lgeria? 1 his question becomes apparent bearing in 
mind that Algeria shares the same explosive factors that have provoked mass revolutions in 
the neighbouring countries: corruption, disproportion in the regional development, pau­
perization of society and the lack of civil and political rights, [ here are several explanations 
for this “immunity to revolution’’, hirst - the fragmentation of Algerian opposition. Sec­
ond - the fear of the return to the violence which Algerians have lived in for 50 years ow ing 
to two brutal conflicts - the war of independence and the civil war of the 90s. T hird - the 
announcement of a raft of political and constitutional reforms bv the present regime, l'ï- 
nallv, the social peace was bought by the promise to resolve Algeria’s long-lasting economic 
problems starting with unemployment, the promise of implementation of the structural 
reforms and especially the direct and indirect transfers of public money (rise of salaries, 
subvention of basic commodities etc.).
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“The domino effect” is a phrase often repeated to describe the phenomena of con­
testation of power undertaken bv the societies of North Africa and Middle East, 
which in recent years have led to the collapse of multiannual regimes. The trigger 
was the protests, which began in Sidi Bouzid in December 2010 in Tunisia, and 
which then spread across the country, forcing the authoritarian president Zine-cl 
Abidine Ben Ali, in power for over 23 years, to leave the country. The fervour of 
revolutionary uprising swept through most of the country’s regions taking more or 
less drastic form. Algeria is an exception in the constellation of declining regimes. 
The question arises: why did the scenario of events that took place in the neigh­
bouring countries (Libya, Tunisia) did not repeat itself in Algeria, even though the 
factors that led to the revolutions in those countries also appear here: corruption 
and nepotism in the government administration structures, strong socio-economic 
inequalities, limiting the fundamental rights and civic freedoms?
On the other hand, stating that the Arab Spring passed unnoticed in Algeria is 
untrue. The “bread protests” took place in bigger cities of Algeria in January 2011, 
shortly before Tunisian and Egyptian revolution. None of these regular forms of 
protest turned into factors that would undermine the status quo, established over 
twenty years ago. The reasons for such state of affairs can be sought in the politi­
cal weakness of Algerian opposition or a skilful simulation of political reforms by 
the regime, guaranteeing its continuity. The factor impacting the stability of the 
system is, undoubtedly, the fear of a repetition of the civil war scenario from the 
years 1990-1999 or, not so unrealistic in the context of events in Egypt and Tuni­
sia - the prospect of Islamisation of the country. The unequivocal factor allowing 
the survival of the regime of Abdelaziz Bouteflika is the position of Algeria in the 
American strategy of Global War on Terror (GWOT). Finally, Algeria’s significant 
oil resources are also of great importance, allowing the rulers the temporary allevia­
tion of social tensions. The strategy of “buying the social peace” is an efficient tool 
in the hands of the ruling party, which Egypt and Tunisia do not have.
Conditions of political and social transformation in Algeria
The Arab Spring did not touch Algeria to such extent as it did Egypt, Tunisia, Libya 
or Syria; however, it is worth noting that this country experienced an upward revolt, 
which started the systemic changes. Protests of October 1998 that engulfed almost 
entire country and began the process of implementation of political reforms, ai­
ming to end the single-party system and de facto the ruling of the National Libera­
tion Front, holding the reign of power continuously since 1962.
The reasons for contestation in the 1980s Algeria are almost identical to those 
that led to the fall of regimes in the countries of MENA region in the years 2010- 
2011. In that period the conflict between the society and government accelerated. 
The latter was not only accused of inept economic policy, but also of lack of democ­
racy, as well as corruption and clientelism. The protests against the government’s 
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policies and opposition to the “appropriation of state” bv narrow ruling elite took 
the form of mass street protests in Algiers in the autumn 1988. Huge crowds of 
protesters came out on the streets, demanding the withdrawal of the increase of 
prices on the necessary articles, improvement of supply, elimination of the ruling 
elite’s privileges, implementation of the fundamental political reforms, and the 
guarantee of civil liberties'.
Constitution introduced on 23rd February 1989 ended the quarter-century era 
of the National Liberation Front’s (NLF) monopoly of power and opened the way 
to the multi-party system. The plans for changes in that period were related to 
ensuring the freedom to nominate the candidates in the municipal and national 
elections and independence of social and political organisations. Between 1989 and 
1990 almost 44 parties were registered. Former opposition groups, including the 
Socialist Forces Front, were legalised. In September 1989 also the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) returns to the political game, campaigning for an immediate introduc­
tion of Islamic republic in Algeria2.
1 Most research confirms that the number of victims was up to 50(1 killed. Thousands suspec­
ted of being involved in organisation of the riots have been arrested, l·’,. Szezepankiewiez, 
Region Xlaghrebu w polityce Linii Europejskiej, Kraków 2010, p. 108.
: F Frederic, “Algérie. La fin du monopole du FI,N. Les députés votent la loi autorisant le
multipartisme”, Le Monde, 4 August 1989, p. 47.
FIS gained 54,3% rotes ant FLN 33,7%·. B. Stora, L’histoire de ¡’Algérie depuis l’indépen­
dance, Paris 1994, p. 95.
1 Ibid.
’ A. Lahouari, “Les partis politiques en Algérie et la crise du régime des grands électeurs”, 
Le Quotidien d’Oran, 12-l3 October 2003.
First multi-party municipal elections from 12th September 1990 modified the 
political scene of Algeria, until then monopolised bv the NLF. The Islamic group 
(FIS) gained a significant advantage over the ruling party’.
The result of the municipal elections, devastating for the ruling partv, brought 
closer the vision of losing the parliamentary elections. As expected, legislative author­
ities elections confirmed the discrediting of the presidential party and support for the 
Islamic group. In the first round of elections which took place in December 1991, 
the Islamic Salvation Front gained 188 seats. The second place was also won by the 
opposition of the regime - the Socialist Forces Front, gaining 25 seats. The third posi­
tion (18 seats in the parliament) fell in the hands of the National Liberation Front4.
As a consequence of the results of parliamentary and local elections, the Alge­
rian regime faced the alternate choice between systemic solution, providing for the 
end of social unrest and integration of opposition parties, including Islamic ones, 
within the political scene, or maintaining the political relationships in the current 
state. The second option prevailed, which was directly connected to closing the 
process of démocratisation and using force. Fearing the loss of own position and 
facing the threat of Islamic integralism, in the autumn 1992 the ruling regime 
chose the “way of the force”’. Afraid of the FIS’ victory in the second round of *1
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elections, the High Council of State decided to suspend the electoral process. Is­
lamic Salvation Front was dissolved. The country plunged into the long-term civil 
war between the armv, subordinate to the authoritarian regime, and the Islamic 
militias6.
Since 1992 the power in Algeria has effectively been in the hands of the armv 
Keeping up the appearances of democracy, the superficial political reforms are in­
troduced, and the regular elections to the representative bodies are carried out. The 
real executive power rests in the hands of presidents, “anointed” by the generals, 
successively since 1992: Ali Kafi, Liamine Zeroual, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The par­
liament is controlled by the so-called coalition of the president, the parties that are 
friendly towards the regime: National Liberation Front, National Rally for Democ­
racy and the Movement for the Society of Peace - not very socially representative 
group of moderate Islam. Islamic Salvation Front remains deprived of the pos­
sibility of having the parliamentary representation, and some of the opposition 
groups, including the Socialist Forces Front, decided to boycott the elections to the 
legislative authorities, which in the view of its leaders are deprived of any ability to 
make an impact, and are only serving the current regime. The state of emergency 
introduced in 1992 has allowed controlling the society, as well as unpunished use 
of repressive measures, including behaviours against the system. An important ele­
ment of the regime remains highly developed apparatus of coercion and the posi­
tion of army in the system'.
The authoritarian nature of the system is strengthened by the actions aimed 
to concentrate the executive power in the hands of one man. In 2007 the amend­
ment to the constitution was introduced, abolishing the limiting of the presidential 
terms to two, opening the way for Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s presidency for life.
Other elements of procedural democracy and assemblies are not guaranteed. 
All association and media activity is controlled. Between December 1999 and Janu­
ary 2012 no new political party was registered. Despite the liberalisation of the 
Code of Press in 1990, abolishing the monopoly of the state in the field of informa­
tion, the journalistic activity is subject to restrictions. The provisions of the Code 
of media guarantee the freedom of speech, except cases of questioning “the dignity 
of individual, the imperatives of foreign policy and national defence”. The Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides for a wide range of punishment, including prison, for 
slander or insult of state institutionss.
About situation in Algeria between 1900-1992 see more in: A. Kasznik-Cbristian, Alge­
ria, Warszawa 2006, pp. 449-457.
See more about the results of parliamentary election in 2002 in. Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
Report, Algeria, [on-line] http://www.ipu.org/parline-f/rcports/1003_arc.btm, 30 April 2013; 
see more about parliamentary election in 2007: [on-line] http://193.194.78.233/ma_fr/sto 
rics.pbp?topic=07/04/09/8619480, 30 April 2014.
A. Agbrout, Y.ll. Zoubir, „Algerie: des reformes politiques pour eluder le Printcmps 
arabe”, Alternatives Sud (Le Printemps arabe: un premier bilan) Voi. 19, 2012, no. 2, p. 139; 
E. Szczcpankicwicz, <>p. cit., pp. 293-296.
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The indicated factors are the reason why the traditional sources of legitimacy 
of power based on the affiliation with the independence movement and political 
base of NLF, are weakened. The phenomenon of lack of identification of society 
with the ruling power is becoming more and more visible, as evidenced by the low 
election attendance, around 30-40% in the last decade (35.6% in the parliamentary 
elections in 2007)l). A survey of the independent Algerian journal, El Watan, con­
ducted in 2011, showed that 75% of respondents do not trust the parliament, see­
ing in it an institution with little political influence, in which the MPs defend their 
own or their supporters’ interests111. Clientelism and nepotism in the administra­
tion and business are not the only conflict-inflicting factors in the Algerian society. 
The lines of social divide occur between the francophone and arabophone elites, 
between the Arab and Berber communities, and finally between the politically and 
economically privileged higher class and the pauperised residents of provinces lo­
cated further away from the metropolis.
The analysis of conditions which may lead to the societal contestation of power 
cannot be short of economic factors. Algerian model of economy is characterised 
by similar elements that caused overthrowing the political regimes in neighbouring 
countries. In Algeria, similarly as in other Arab countries, from the moment of gain­
ing independence, the economic model of the so-called patrimonial capitalism has 
been developed, in which the loyalty of the citizens was maintained in exchange for 
the guarantee of economic and social stability. In other words, the subordination of 
the society ensured the provision of certain services by the state, such as education, 
health services and benefits, employment in the public sector, economic privileges, 
guarantee of supply of the basic articles, subsidisation of food, etc.11
In the system of patrimonial capitalism in the longer-term perspective there 
are phenomena negative from the point of view of the economy. First of all, the 
state is over-represented in the economy, which is reflected in the significant size 
of the public sector, bureaucracy, and high level of employment in the public sec­
tor12. In fact, the public sector is the biggest employer. The unemployment among 
the young people remains problematic, equal to approx. 21% in the age group of 
18-25 years, as well as the size of the informal market, evaluated at the end of the 
first decade of the 21st century as approx. 40% of the annual GDR The weakest 
link remains the dependency on the energy sector. Compared to other countries of
„LAlgcric à contre-courant du Printemps arabe”, l,e Monde, 12 May 2012, [on-line] http:// 
www.1einonde.fr/afriquc/article/2012/05/12/l-algcric-a-contrc-courant-du-printenips-arabc_ 
1700317_3212.html, 20 October 2014.
A. Agh rou t, Y.I I. Zoubir, op. cit., p. 132.
O. Schlumbcrgcr, “Structural reforni, économie order and development: patrimonial 
capitalism”, Review <>f International Political P.cononiy Vol. 15, 2008, no. 4, p. 17, [on-line] 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00692290802260670 .
S. Ben Ncfissa, “Les révolutions arabes: les angles morts de l’analyse politique des sociétés 
de la région”, Confluences Méditerranée Vol. 77, 2011, no. 2, p. 78. [on-line] http://dx.doi. 
org/ 10.3917/comc.077.0075.
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MENA region, rich in oil and gas, Algeria has the least diversified production - 97% 
of its export is oil and its derivatives. Moreover, in recent y ears the share of the en­
ergy sector in GDP increased from 30% to 50% in 2008 and to almost 70% in 201I1’. 
In accordance with the indicators of the World Bank in 2011 Doing Business, Al­
geria took the 136th place amongst the 183 researched countries* 14 *. Unfavourable 
investment climate is the reason whv the country is not able to attract foreign 
investors. Furthermore, 40% of direct foreign investments are made in the energy 
industry, sector generating less than 5% jobs per year.
l? 11. Darboucbc, Algeria’s failed transition to a sustainable polity, MEDPRO technical Re­
port no. 8, October 2(111, [on-line] http://www.isn.cthz.ch/isn/Digital-Iabrarv/Publications/  
Detail/?ots591 =()c54c3b3-lc9c-bcle-2c24-a6a8c706()233&lng=cn&id = 134566, 30 April 
2013.
14 Ibid.
According to the statement of Ministry of Interior in Algeria, five persons have died and eight 
hundreds base been injured (majority among the policemen) during the riots (A. Aghrout, 
Y.11. Zoubir, op. cit., p. 140).
1,1 Ibid.
Arab Spring in Algeria
The beginning of 2011, when the protests in the countries of North Africa and 
Middle East took place, was not peaceful also in Algeria. Between 3rd and 7th Janua­
ry 2011 mass strikes swept through Algeria, caused bv the increase of prices of the 
staple food products1’. Caused by the price increase of mainly two products: oil and 
sugar, they were named “oil strikes” by the media, referring to “bread protests” that 
rocked the political scene of Algeria in 1980s. The media discourse highlighted pu­
rely economic character of the social claims, although this was more often accom­
panied by the hopes for political change. Their embodiment became the National 
Coordination for Democratic Change (CNCD), established on 21st January 2011. 
The initiative was formed with the participation of Algerian League for Human 
Rights, a number of autonomous trade unions and political parties. This informal 
platform uniting various opposition groups had specific goals: abolition of the state 
of emergency, liberalisation of media, wider political participation of the citizens 
and release of prisoners detained during the January demonstrations. Despite the 
attempts to mobilise the society through organising a series of protests, the oppo­
sition movement did not grow to such extend like in the other countries of the 
region. The culminating moment was to be the demonstration planned for 12th Fe­
bruary 2011 in the capital city. The intentions of the organisers, however, were tor­
pedoed by the preventive measures of the local authorities and the police. The City 
Council’s decision of 7th February banned the organisation of the march, citing the 
regulation issued in June 2001, prohibiting the organisation of public gatherings in 
the capital and the necessity to preserve the public order16. Nevertheless, CNCD 
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upheld the earlier decision to organise the protesting inarch. The demonstrators 
were dispersed by police forces, sent to the place where the march began, in the 
number of 20 thousand policemen.
In addition to the effective preventive activities, the regime also took action to 
calm the social tension through a number of concessions and proposals for socio­
political reforms. First one was to satisfy the postulate of protesters to abolish the 
state of emergency, in force since 1992. The Cabinet Council’s decision of 22nd Feb­
ruary 2011 was supported by the words of president Bouteflika, who said that “the 
abolition of the state of emergency after nineteen vears will open a new page in the 
history of the country, which must be accompanied by the political reforms”1'. Fol­
lowing these statements, the National Commission for Consultation on Political 
Reforms was appointed, which was to serve the purpose of a special communica­
tion tool in the relations between the ruling party and opposition, and a field for 
discussion on the subject of the proposed by both parties changes.
1 Ibid., p. 145.
Is lbid.,p. 142.
1,1 Various mainstream parties (national, Islamic ones) took part in the election of 1997, 2002, 
2007 and 2012. However their possibility of action was limited. The majority in chosen 
parliaments has always belonged to the regime supported parties.
In result of the consultations, the president was provided with the report which 
contained the projects for electoral reform, guarantees of a wider representation of 
women in the parliament, and the reform of media law. The report was adopted by 
both houses of parliament in the autumn 2011.
While it is still too early to assess the attempts of “political thaw” made by the 
authorities, a few comments can be made here. Some controversy may be induced by 
the very members of the Commission for Consultation. Its appointed chairman was 
Abdelkader Bensalah, the president of National Council. Two close advisors of presi­
dent Bouteflika, Mohamed Touati and Mohamed Ali Boughazi, were appointed as 
vice-presidents. During the two-months’ long operation, the Council’s consultation 
included nearly two hundred parties, associations and civic organisations. Major­
ity of them refused the dialogue, demanding the appointment of a wider platform 
of international debate. Remarkable is the fact that the former presidents (Chadli 
Bendjedid, Ali Kafi, Liamine Zéroual) and Prime Ministers (Mokdad Safi, Mouloud 
Mamrouche, Ali Benflis) refused to participate in the presidential initiative.
The superficial character of activities is additionally confirmed by the reform to 
increase the representation of women in the parliament. In the originally assumed 
version, the parity envisaged for women was to equal minimum 33% of the total 
seats in the National Assembly. As a result of the parliamentary majority of votes 
(a coalition of presidential parties - RND and FLN), the solution was adapted 
where the number of female MPs was dependent on the number of seats allocated 
to the individual electoral districtsls. Another step serving the “refreshing” of the 
political scene was issuing the authorisation in October 2011 for the formation 
of new political parties1'1. Additionally, the increase of the number of seats in the 
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National Assembly from 389 to 462 was intended to widen the participation of po­
litical formations in the parliament. As a result of legalising the new parties, their 
number rose to 43 in 2011. Such large atomisation of the political scene is de facto 
a beneficial situation for the tight presidential parties’ coalition. It was not weak­
ened even by the exit from the coalition of the party of moderate Islam: Movement 
for the Society of Peace. The new act on political parties raised criticism for one 
more reason2". In accordance with its terms, the consent for the so-called “political 
nomadism” was introduced, i.e. the transfer of members from one group to another 
during the same terms of the assembly, which to a large extend favoured the large 
parties (National Rally for Democracy, National Liberation Front) at the expense 
of smaller, newer parties. Secondly, the amendment left in force the ban of forming 
new political parties on the members of Islamic Salvation Front, thereby leaving 
the largest opposition party outside of the political scene.
Another action taken by the regime, aiming to neutralise the social contesta­
tion, is making governmental money transfers. The redistribution policy of income 
from oil sales is an indisputable tool in the hands of the rentier state regimes. Its 
effectiveness cannot be overestimated, and in the perspective of regimes’ stability 
it counteracts popularisation and politicisation of the social and economic needs of 
citizens. In accordance with the Budget Act estimated for the year 2012, 1 500 bil­
lion Algerian Dinars (approx. 15 billion Euros) were programmed. Additionally, the 
increase in spending is expected of approx. 10% in relation to 2011, of which 2 8850 
billion DA for clerical salaries, 1 300 billion for social services, and 200 billion DA 
for the subsidy of food products (sugar, oils, cereals, milk)20 1. Another category of 
people benefiting from the direct distribution are pensioners. Starting from Janu­
ary 2012 all provisions increased on overage by 15 00 DA (150 Euros), which on 
average costs the budget 630 million Euros annually22. The fact of undertaking 
the number of activities for young people affected by unemployment, who are - as 
shown by the events in neighbouring countries - the major force behind the revo­
lution, is also not surprising (the system of preferential investment loans, financial 
incentives for young entrepreneurs, and support for the creation of new jobs).
20 “Ce que dit la nouvelle loi sur les partis politiques”, Le Quotidien d’Oran, 18 January 2012, 
[on-line] littp://www.algeria-\vatcli.org/fr/article/just/loi_partis.litin, 30 April 2013.
21 A. Aglirout, Y.l I. Zoubir, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
22 Budget project for 2012, Ministry of l'inancc of Algeria, [on-line] http://www.inf.gov.dz/ 
articlc_pdf/upl-9Odc5cOe 14f92b300a7cf779bf579efc.pdf, 30 April 2013.
The proposed reforms, which were included in the agenda of changes, such as 
the guarantee of women’s equality, freedom of media, free election campaigning, 
did not introduce a new quality on the Algerian political scene. The parliamentary 
elections of 12"’ May 2012 seem to confirm the above thesis. An absolute majority 
in the National Assembly remained with the coalition of two presidential parties: 
National Liberation Front and National Rally for Democracy, winning 288 seats 
out of 462. Bouteflika’s party’s strength remained, even despite the exit from the 
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coalition of the party of moderate Islam - Movement for the Society of Peace. On 
the similar level, in relation to the previous elections, the voter turnout was main­
tained: approx. 42.9%, and in the region of Kabvlie, one of the most opposing to 
the current rulers, below 3O%* 25. The regime adopted the strategy of half-measures 
and superficial reforms, clearly indicating that it is not intending to share the power 
with the society. As rightly noted by the expert on the Algerian political scene, 
Charef:
“['Algérie à contre-courant du Printemps arabe”, /,e Monde, 12 Mav 2012, [on-line] littp:// 
www.lemondc.fr/afrique/articlc/20l2/05/12/l-algcric-a-contre-courant-du-printcmps-arabe_ 
1700317_3212.html, 30 April 2013.
A. Cliaref, “Par où commencer la réforme”, Le Quotidien d'Oran, 28 April 2011, [on-line] 
Il ttp://www.lcquot idicn-oran.com/indcx. pli p?tcxt = %22commcncer-l-la+ rcformc%22&ca te 
gory_id = 0, 30 April 2013.
S. Clicna, “[Algérie dans le Printemps arabe. Filtre espoirs, tentatives et blocages”, 
Confluences Méditerranée Vol. 2, 2011, no. 77, p. 106, [on-line] http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ 
comc.077.01 (15.
“('···) planned reforms and undertaken actions as a result amounted to absurd activi­
ties, involving the replacement of laws which remained a dead letter - by the others, 
which also will not be followed (..
The factors neutralising the processes of transformation 
in Algeria
The actions undertaken by the regime in response to the social protests effectively 
eliminated the insurrectionary fervour in Algeria. “The strategy of neutralisation” 
of the Arab spring consisted mainly of combined use of two elements - mobilisation 
of significant police forces in order to break up the demonstrations, and considered 
strategy of political concessions and economic reforms, even short-term, aiming to 
alleviate the arising social discontent2’.
Trying to determine the nature of the opposition movement in Algeria, in that 
specific for the region period of 201 1-2012, one should pay attention to the fre­
quently emerging term: “Algerian syndrome”, which to some extent explains the 
country being less prone to the phenomenon of the Arab Spring. Two events should 
be mentioned here, which recorded themselves tragically on the pages of history of 
Algeria in the 20th century. First was the independence war in a period 1954-1962, 
one of the bloodiest wars of the colonv with the metropolis, in this case - France. 
The second are the events of the civil war of 1992-1999, which set on the opposite 
sides of the barricade the government forces and Islamic militia. The memory of 
the bloody events of the period in 1990s is an element blocking all actions aiming 
to overthrow the current system. Ahmad Aghrout writes of Algeria as of the coun­
try, which “(...) has not yet recovered from the events of the civil war, and in which 
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the society is affected by the syndrome of the post-traumatic stress”26 *29. The course 
of revolutions in Syria or Libya seems to mute all revolutionary movements and 
explain the indolence of society
26 A. Aghrout, Y.l I. Zoubir, op. cit., p. 63. Similar argumentation is proposed by Mansouria
Mokhcfi in: M. Mokhefi, “Maghreb: révolutions inachevées?”, La politique étrangère 2012, 
no. 1, p. 78, [on-line] http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/pe. 121.0071.
2/ 1,. Addi, “Le régime algérien après les révoltes arabes”, l,a Découverte Vol. 2, 2011, no. 66,
p. 95, [on-line] http://dx.d0i.0rg/l 0.3917/mouv.066.0089.
2S A. Baghzouz, “I’,Algérie et les révoltes arabes: ni exception ni domino”, Outre-terre Vol. 3, 
2011, no. 29, p. 168, [on-line] http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/outc.029.0159 .
29 “Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)”, GlobalSecurity.org, [on-line] 
http://www.globalsccurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm, 30 April 2013.
In foreign scientific literature, especially the French one, there are mail}· theories sugges­
ting that Algerian Secret intelligence Service have cooperated with the members of Isla-
“The Algerian exception” can also be explained by a weak coordination of activ­
ities of opposition groups, which were unable to create one front of opposition join­
ing various segments and social interests. “The great absentee” of the National Co­
ordination for Democratic Change was the Socialist Forces Front. This one of the 
largest opposition parties of Algeria refused to participate in the collective marches 
of those dissatisfied, opting for more pacifist and interactive form of pressure2 . 
The propagandist tone of the media that presented it as an initiative inspired bv 
the Berber activists and the Rally for Culture and Democracy or the formation con­
nected to the radical Islam also worked to the disadvantage of the Coordination2,5.
Moreover, the weakness of the opposition and its internal divides decided that 
in lieu of the movement of general social contestation, smaller sector or industry 
demonstrations were organised. Scattered protests were easier for the government 
to control than the social revolt.
Additional factor in silencing all actions undertaken towards the political 
change is the support of the US administration for the country of Bouteflika as 
a key element in the American strategy in the fight against international terror­
ism. On the territory of the city of Tamanrasset a joint military headquarters and 
intelligence centre are located. Algiers plays an important role in the Trans-Sahara 
Counter Terrorism Partnership, the American initiative from 2 0 042'1. The threat of 
Islamic radicalism within individual countries (Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
En-Nahda) and internationally (MUJAO - Unity Movement for Jihad in West Af­
rica, the Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb), exacerbated by the events of the Arab 
Spring, allows the Algerian regime to persist, from time to time playing the “card 
of the terrorist threat” and enjoying the support of the West. It is worth noting 
that this “terrorist annuity” (French: rente du terrorisme) is used by the Algerian 
regime not for the first time. Even before the events of 11th September 2011 and 
the announcement of the American strategy of fighting international terrorism 
(GWOT), A. Bouteflika manipulated the threat of Islamic integrism in the region 
of Sahel, in order to ensure the backing of the US and, what follows, the supply of 
weapons and support for the program of modernisation of the army30.
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The Summary
In case of Algeria the term ‘Arab Spring” takes a special meaning. If we understand 
it as an uprising of the society for démocratisation of the system, then it should be 
assumed that the revolution in this largest African country took place in the end of 
1980s. A short chapter of démocratisation, started by the social disorder, whose rea­
sons we find in analogous uprisings in Tunisia or Egypt over twenty years later, was 
quickly closed by the regime, which was not willing to share the power. The period 
of 1988-1992, which can be called the “opening of the system”, and the subsequent 
decade of the civil war, determined the directions and dynamics of further changes. 
In other words, the events of the end of the 20th century made Algeria resistant to 
the syndrome of Arab Spring of 2011.
The factors that contributed to the “Algerian exception” can be synthetically 
summarised in seven sections:
1. Fear of return of violence known from the times of civil war in 1990s. The 
sense of relative stability, provided by the regime, with the constant terrorist threat 
inside Algeria and from neighbouring countries.
2. Negative turn of events in the neighbouring countries experiencing the “Arab 
Spring”. The examples of Egypt and Libya, which succumbed into chaos, or Tu­
nisia, which entered uncertain and arduous path of democratic changes, do not 
support the positive image of the revolution’s aftermath.
3. Pretend démocratisation from above bv the military regime through func­
tioning of the institutions of parliamentary and presidential common and secret 
elections, introducing reforms increasing the scope of civil liberties, independence 
of media, and the possibility to form associations and political parties.
4. The weakness of civil society movements in Algeria and no possibility to mo­
bilise both from the side of the democratic front and the radical Islam.
5. Developing the rentier state tvpe of economy, in which the income from 
selling the energy resources allows maintaining the clientelist system of dependen­
cies supporting the regime, and also easing the social tensions with the financial 
transfers.
6. The frequency of outbreaks of discontent and strikes, which preceded the 
mobilisation in Algiers at the beginning of 2011, led to their trivialisation. The re­
gime leaves a margin of freedom for gatherings, allowing the organisation of sector 
demonstrations, mainlv of economic nature, at the same time weakening the pos­
sibility to organise the general social occurrences, carrying with them the demands 
for political change.
7. The stability of the system shaped in 1962 was built based on the balance 
maintained between several clans, who, remaining in the net of close relationships,
mie Combat Group (C3ia) and Al Qacda in the Islamic Maghreb, J.l I. Kcnnan, “Politique 
étrangère et GWOT dans la reproduction du pouvoir algérien”, Revue du Tiers Monde 2012, 
no. 2, pp. 31-50, [on-line] bttp://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rtm.210.0031. 
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stand behind the most important political and economic decisions. De facto, the 
Algeria’s regime is hard to personalise, identify with one person or even one fam­
ily, in order to blame them for the dysfunctions in the country, as it happened, for 
instance, in Tunisia, identified with the Ben Ali-Trabelsi family, or in the case of the 
family of Husni Mubarak in Egypt.
The Algerian regime emerged victorious from the confrontation with Arab 
Spring. This does not mean that its position is not threatened. The structural eco­
nomic problems have not been resolved, and only temporarily drowned. The politi­
cal crises and legitimacy of government combine with the economic problems of 
the country. The main force of demonstrations in 2010 and 2011, but also in the 
earlier ones of 1988, was youth, born long after 1954, not remembering the times 
of independence war. As Albert Bourgi notes: “The outbreak of discontent, which 
has struck Algeria, revealed many divisions within the society (...) and sharpened 
the conflict between the ruling team, which has held the reins of power since the 
independence, and the generation of people who did not take part in that fight 
and have not got the same political memory as the political leaders of NLF’1”. In 
the eyes of majority of the society the political leaders are hermetic caste, whose 
members share the positions, privileges, wealth. The expression of current system 
rejection were further anti-system demonstrations, organised at the time of the 
presidential campaign in March and April 2014, when the citizens, as an act of 
protest against the fourth term of Bouteflika, carried the banners with the slogan: 
Barakat (“it’s enough”)’2.
11 J.-J. 1,avenue, Algérie. l,a démocratie interdite, Paris 2000, p. 24.
Λ. Boubekeur, “l'Algérie. Eaprcs-Bouteflika a commence”, Be Monde, 15 April 2014, 
[on-line] http://www.lemondc.fr/idccs/article/2014/04/1 5/algcrie-l-aprcs-boutcflika-a-com 
mcncc_4400889_3232.html, 30 September 2014.
” “Algérie « Tn simulacre de transition ne réglera rien »”, interview with Muhammad I lache- 
maoui, 28 April 2014, Algeria-Wdtch, [on-line] http://www.algcria-watcli.org/fr/article/pol/ 
anp_prcsidcncc/liachcmaoui_simulacrc_transition.htm, 30 September 2014.
According to the observers of the Algerian political scene the election of Boute­
flika for the fourth term is the compromise choice, with lack of agreement between 
the real centres of power (Intelligence and Security Agency, DRS, the leaders of the 
NLF, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) as to the person that would 
be a successor. De facto the selection of ill politician for the head of the coun­
try is a move preceding bigger manoeuvres on the political scene of Algeria. The 
post-Bouteflika era has already been opened during the election campaign, when 
Abdelmalek Sellai, the prime minister responsible for the campaign of the general, 
indicated that “the transfer of power to the younger generation will take place in 
201 5 at the latest””.
Two scenarios await Algeria. According to the first, the so-called transforma­
tion, or rather transferring power before the elections, will take place. The cur­
rent president, unable to fulfil this function due to health reasons, will delegate 
its prerogatives to the indicated by the triangle of power candidate, who will be, 11
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similarly as his predecessor, the emanation of the “hvper-presidential” system, and 
in reality - the executor of the decisions made on the backstage of the political 
scene. According to the second, more positive scenario, the power will come to the 
representative of the younger generation of militaries, e.g. Ali Benflis, whose name 
was already mentioned in the presidential campaign of 2014; he, on the other hand, 
will undertake the coordination of the process of political transformation, opening 
the way to the consultations with the widely understood civil society. There is no 
doubt, however, that any political change in Algeria will not take place without the 
involvement of the army.
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